The paper considers an exchange economy with incomplete information in which agents can retrade goods until all gains from trade are exhausted. Unimprovable allocations are de ned to be those allocations from which a g e n ts would not wish to deviate either by r etrading goods or by r e v ealing further information. The concept of unimprovability is then used to analyze a lemons market and an adverse selection insurance market in which agents can renegotiate after information has been revealed. Finally, unimprovability is compared to di erent concepts of e ciency and to the concept of durability.
Introduction
In an exchange economy with complete information, the concept of Pareto e ciency describes all allocations for which gains from trade are exhausted. Thu s , i f a g e n ts obtain through trading an allocation which i s P areto e cient, agents cannot improve through further trading. What concept describes the absence of improving trades for an economy with incomplete information?
Consider an exchange economy with di erentially informed agents. In the case of incomplete information, the process of obtaining an allocation and of information revelation cannot be separated. Thus, intuitively, e a c h trade can be thought to occur in two steps. First, information is exchanged. Then agents execute trades which are contingent on the revealed information. In contrast to the case of complete information, the outcome of a trade is therefore not only characterized by the allocation of consumption goods but also by the amount of information which has been revealed. We de ne such an outcome as unimprovable, if agents would not want to deviate from it either by retrading or by r e v ealing additional information.
Implicit in our concept of unimprovability i s t h a t a g e n ts cannot be forced to adhere to a prespeci ed outcome. In contrast, standard notions such a s ex-ante, interim, or ex-post incentive e ciency assume that agents cannot retrade. This results in the following di erences. In ex-ante, interim, and ex-post incentive e cient allocations one can assume without loss of generality that agents reveal all information. In contrast, complete information revelation does not necessarily arise in our solution concept. In particular, agents' ability to retrade in the presence of complete information would result in allocations which are Pareto e cient with respect to complete information, and such allocations can in general not be obtained because of incentive problems.
There is also another important di erence between trade under complete and trade under incomplete information which is incorporated in our solution concept. With complete information, each trade can be seen independent o f other trades. That is, in order to show that an allocation can be improved upon, it is su cient t o s h o w that there exists an allocation which i m p r o ves upon the status quo. It is irrelevant whether or not the new trades and new allocations themselves can be improved upon any further. With incomplete information trades cannot be considered independent of each other as they a ect agents' decisions about revealing information.
For example, consider an adverse selection problem in an insurance mar-ket where the insurer o ers a contract which separates the insured agents by their types low and high risk. Typically, separation of types is possible if the low-risk agents receive only partial insurance. Now consider a second trade which o ers complete insurance to the low-risk types given that all information has been revealed. If the rst trade is followed by the second one, then a high-risk agent w i l l a l w ays pretend to be a low-risk agent. In contrast, if only the rst decision rule is considered, separation of types is possible.
In the context of collective c hoice problems, Green and La ont 1 4 a n d Forges 12 discuss the e ects of recontracting. Apart from considering a di erential information economy, the concept in this paper di ers, by making agents' decisions on information revelation and retrading contingent o n their expected further retrades. 1 In order to do this, we specify agents' expected nal allocations and revealed information given a particular status quo characterized by an allocation and the amount of information revealed through previous trades. This expectation function must be consistent, that is, it should not be possible for agents to improve u p o n a n y expected nal allocations. We de ne an allocation together with the publicly revealed informed to be unimprovable if it can be obtained starting from agents' initial endowments.
In this paper after introducing the concept of unimprovable allocations, we p r o vide a general existence result. Next, we c haracterize unimprovable allocations for a lemons market and for an insurance problem with adverse selection. We then compare our solution concept to interim incentive eciency and durability as de ned in Holmstr om and Myerson 17 . Finally, i n the concluding remarks we discuss the relationship to the core with di erential information of Yannelis 30 and the core of Allen 3 and Vohra 28 .
Our solution concept combines cooperative and non-cooperative features. Speci cally, information revelation follows a non-cooperative game. In contrast, the choices on alternative trades and information revelation are made cooperatively by all agents. Thus, there are some relationships between the concepts introduced in this paper and those which can be found in the literature on cooperative game theory and its application to economies with di erential information.
First, our expectation functions are related to the standards of behavior de ned in Greenberg 15 . A standard of behavior de nes for each position of a game|in our model a position corresponds to an allocation and to the amount of publicly revealed information|a nal position a coalition of agents will obtain. In the language of Greenberg, our de nition of unimprovability De nition 2 then corresponds to a particular consistency requirement f o r standards of behavior. Similar modeling is used in Chwe 8 to show t h a t i n the resulting solution concept agents are forward looking in contrast to the stable set.
In the literature on cooperative solution concepts with incomplete information authors either impose restrictions on how information is shared by coalitions of agents see Allen Idzik 19 , Vohra 28 This paper di ers from the two approaches by c haracterizing the outcome of trading not only by an allocation of consumption goods but also by the amount of information which is publicly revealed. Thus, similar to the rst group of papers arbitrary new trades which are solely based on publicly revealed information are admissible and not subject to any further incentive constraints. In contrast to the rst group of papers but similar to the second group, trades which reveal additional information are subject to standard incentive compatibility restrictions. However, incentive compatibility is de ned with respect to the information which has already been revealed. Moreover, unlike the rst group of papers, the amount of information revealed by a g e n ts is endogenous in our concept. 2 Finally, there is also a relationship between unimprovability and the concept of renegotiation proofness used in the literature on contracts with incomplete information see Dewatripont and Maskin 10 for a survey of this literature. In principal-agent problems with incomplete information, contracts which are ex-ante incentive e cient c a n t ypically be improved upon once agents' information is revealed. 3 This is the case because any new contract 2 In the rst literature, measurability restrictions on allocations or net-trades for example, measurability with respect to private information are assumed exogenously. T h us, measurability is used instead of incentive compatibility to study the e ects of incomplete information. 3 In most papers in the literature renegotiation occurs after agents have e n tered the only needs to be incentive compatible with respect to the information which has already been publicly revealed. Hence the incentive constraint becomes less binding as time goes on. In the principal-agent literature, renegotiation is typically modeled as a non-cooperative game where one party m a k es a take-it-or-leave-it o er. 4 A c o n tract is renegotiation proof if no such renegotiation o er is made. Given that the motivation for our paper is to describe the result of trading at the interim i.e., when agents are already di erentially informed, unimprovability can be used as a renegotiation proofness constraint. T h a t i s , i f a c o n tract is speci ed ex-ante subject to the constraint that the allocation and publicly revealed information at the interim is unimprovable, then agents will not nd it bene cial to renegotiate the contract at the interim. There are some obvious di erences to the standard version of renegotiation proofness. First, our concept is based on cooperative and on non-cooperative b e h a vior. Secondly, in our model agents takes into account t h a t a n y renegotiated contract itself can be renegotiated further. 5 Thirdly, unimprovability can be used as a concept of renegotiation proofness in contracting problems with more than two a g e n ts or more general information structures, where analyzing a purely non-cooperative renegotiation game might not be tractable.
The Model
We n o w i n troduce the model of an exchange economy with di erential information c.f., Radner 26 . There is a nite number of agents described by I = f1; : : : ; n g. E a c h agent i's consumption set is given by X i .
It should be noted that as in Gale 13 the consumption sets can be rather general. For example, X i can be itself a set of contracts agents can enter in. Agents will then be able to retrade contracts in X i as long as other agents are willing to accept the trades, but they are not able to subsequently alter the form of a contract x i 2 X i which they obtain as the result of trading. Therefore our model does not solely describe economies where agents are unable to commit abstaining from retrades. Rather, through an appropriate de nition
contract. An alternative approach where contract renegotiation occurs before contracts are entered but after information is revealed is considered in Asheim and Nilssen 4 . 4 For a non-cooperative renegotiation game with multiple rounds see for example Beaudry and Poitevin 5 . 5 That is, they are farsight e d a s i n C h we 8 .
of the consumption sets, economies where agents are able to commit not to change certain types of contracts can be accommodated. 6 There is uncertainty o ver the state of the economy. This is described by the probability space ; A; . In order to simplify the exposition, we will assume throughout the paper that is nite and that f!g 0 for all ! 2 .
Agents are di erentially informed about the state. In particular, each agent i's information is given by F i , a partition of . That is, each a g e n t i knows the element of her partition which c o n tains the true state of nature.
If an agent i receives additional information G then her information is given by F i _ G which is the partition generated by F i and G. 7 Throughout the paper we assume that all information revelation is public.
That is, all agents re ne their own information partition F i with the same partition G, w h i c h describes the publicly revealed information. vi is the agents' common prior ex ante, a probability o n .
Unimprovability
In order to nd a concept of unimprovability for incomplete information, the following questions must be addressed.
A1
What is the set of allocations that can be obtained given agents' information? A2 What does it mean that an alternative allocation and further information revelation improves upon the status quo? Moreover, how can such an allocation be characterized? A3 How d o a g e n ts evaluate alternative allocations that can be improved upon further? Questions A1 A3 summarize the main di culties which arise when one analyzes trade under incomplete information.
In Section 3.1, we address A1, i.e., we c haracterize incentive compatible decision rules. The di erences to the incentive compatibility notion which i s used for example in the de nition of ex-ante incentive e ciency are that agents do not necessarily reveal all their information, that agents update their utility with respect to publicly revealed information rather than using ex-ante utility, and that information revelation may be sequential. A2 is addressed in Section 3.2. Finally, A3 is addressed in Section 3.3 and the de nition of unimprovability i s p r o vided.
Incentive Compatibility
As mentioned above, in economies with di erential information trade and information revelation cannot be treated independent o f e a c h other. Thus, we imagine that agents rst reveal some of their private information. Then trades are executed based on this information. Further information revelation and trades can be thought of in exactly the same way.
A status quo in our economy will be described by a feasible allocation x i , i 2 I and by the amount of information G which has been publicly revealed through trading. 8 We n o w describe the conditions under which it is possible to obtain an allocationx i , i 2 I and information 9Ĝ G given that the status quo is given by x i , i 2 I and G.
In this paper we assume that trades are publicly observable. Thus, the net tradesx i ,x i must beĜ-measurable for all agents i 2 I. T ruthful revelation of information then means that each a g e n t reports an event i n w h i c h c o n tains 8 For example, x i , i 2 I and G trivial, corresponds to the situation at which trading starts. Recall that in addition to G, a g e n ts also have their private information F i . 9 For two information partitions F, G we w r i t e F G if F is weakly ner than G. Similar, F G means that F G but F 6 = G.
the true state of nature. For example, let = f! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 g. Then reporting f! 1 ; ! 2 g whenever ! 1 or ! 2 has occurred, and reporting f! 3 g whenever ! 3 has occurred would be a truthful report. If the agent has complete information then her report would be truthful but not fully revealing.
Is it possible to reveal arbitrary information partitionsĜ through the simultaneous reports which are usually considered in information revelation games? The answer is no. Consider the following example. G can clearly not be revealed if only one agent announces information.
In particular, if only one of the agents, say a g e n t 1 , r e v eals information then F 1 will be publicly revealed. Thus both agents must announce information. However, if both agents announce information simultaneously then full information revelation will be the result. Consequently, announcements must be sequential in order to obtainĜ.
InformationĜ can be revealed as follows. First agent 1 announces F 1 , i.e., depending on the state either f! 1 ; ! 2 g or f! 3 ; ! 4 g is reported. As a result, agent 2 will have full information. Thus, agent 2 can reportĜ. Speci cally, the agent reports either f! 1 g, o r f! 2 g or f! 3 ; ! 4 g, depending on the state.
Sequential information revelation will naturally occur in our model. For example, assume that starting from their endowment agents reveal information G and obtain an allocation x i , i 2 I. Further information revelation then leads toĜ G and retrading tox i , i 2 I. As Example 1 indicates such sequential information revelation can lead to information setsĜ which cannot be obtained through a single round of information revelation.
We n o w specify the structure of the information revelation game. The sequential information revelation game can go over t = 1 ; : : : ; Trounds. In each round t, a g e n ts report elements in a partition M i t of . These partitions become weakly ner i.e., M i t M i t,1 for every i 2 I and for every t 2
T. Finally, after T rounds informationĜ is completely revealed, i.e.,Ĝ = W i2I M i T . W e w i l l s a y that the allocationx i , i 2 I is incentive compatible given x i , i 2 I, G if announcing truthfully is optimal in each round, where optimal means that the announcement strategies are a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 10 Below w e p r o vide a formal description of the game and of the strategies.
For given x i , i 2 I, G, a sequential information revelation game is given by fM i t ; i t ; F i _ G ; ; ; z i ; i j i 2 Ig, where Remark. Since agents use pure strategies in the above game, the assumption of truthful revelation of information is without loss of generality.
Trade and Information Revelation
We n o w address the question what it means for an alternative allocationx i , i 2 I,Ĝ to improve upon the status quo i.e, upon the current allocation x i , i 2 I, G.. In order to obtain the alternative allocation, agents must rst reveal informationĜ Of course, ifĜ = G no further information revelation is necessary. Each a g e n t i then evaluatesx i , i 2 I with respect to expected utility conditioned on information F i _Ĝ. T h us, if Eu i !;x i j F i _Ĝ ! Eu i !;x i j F i _Ĝ !; 1 10 In a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium agents strategies are a Nash equilibrium in all states and time periods given that beliefs are derived using Bayes' rule whenever possible. 11 In order for x i + z i 2 X i , w e m ust assume as in Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite 18 that agents cannot over report their endowments. For simplicity of exposition we abstract from this issue. 12 As mentioned above, a truthful report means that each a g e n t i reports the element o f the partition M i t that contains the true state of nature.
for all i 2 I and for all ! 2 , all agents are weakly better o by trading from the status quo to the new allocation. If the strict inequality holds for an agent i with positive probability then agent i is strictly better o . However, what happens ifx i ,Ĝ makes the agents only better o in some but not all states, i.e., if inequality 1 holds only for some but not for all states? Then if the set of states where 1 holds is not common knowledge information, additional information is revealed. This new information must be taken into account w h e n e v aluating the alternative allocation. In order to illustrate this point, consider the following example. 13 Example 2. Assume there are two agents i = 1 ; 2. There are two c o nsumption goods per state and two states of nature = f0;1g which o ccur with the same probability. B o t h a g e n ts' utility functions are given by u!;x 1 ; x 2 = !x 1 + x 2 . Assume that agent 1 has full information, i.e., the agent k n o ws the true state of the economy. On the other hand, agent 2 has no information. Thus, we h a ve speci ed a lemons problem" in which good 1 is either worthless or a perfect substitute for good 2. and agent 1 will choose to stay with the original allocation. On the other hand, agent 2 does not know the state and therefore puts equal probabilities on states 1 and 2. As a consequence, agent 2 is better o under the alternative allocation. Does this mean that the alternative allocation will be adopted in state ! = 0 ?
The alternative allocation would be adopted if agent 2 b e h a ves naively and does not take i n to account that agent 1 will only switch to the alternative allocation in state 0. However, in state 0, agent 2 is better o under the original allocation. Thus, if agent 2 is rational, the alternative allocation would not be adopted and hence does not block the original allocation. 16 We n o w provide the formal de nition.
14 Consider how this argument applies for Example 2. For any g i v en A we use 2 to de ne the corresponding allocation. In order to ensure that 1 holds for agent 1 w e must choose A = f0g. H o wever, given this choice of A, condition 1 does not hold for agent 2 . T h us, the alternative allocation will not be adopted as we h a ve already indicated in Example 2. 15 Note that the law of iterated expectations only implies that E , u 
Unimprovable Allocations
Let x i , i 2 I be an allocation and let G denote the information which has been revealed. Assume that agents decide whether or not to obtain allocation x i , i 2 I through trading and to reveal informationĜ G in the process. However, unlessx i , i 2 I is itself an allocation which cannot be improved upon, agents will expect further trades to occur. This will have an impact on incentive compatibility. F or example, assume agents expect that afterx i , i 2 I,Ĝ further trades will nally lead to y i , i 2 I, H. Then agents' decision whether or not to reportĜ truthfully will depend on y i , i 2 I, rather than onx i , i 2 I.
Thus, in order to have a consistent notion of incentive compatibility, agents must have for each allocation x i , i 2 I, G a correct expectation of the nal allocation they will obtain trough further trades.
Thus, let C = fx 1 ; : : : ; x n ; G j P i2I x i = P i2I e i , a n d G is a partition of g. Then the expected nal allocation and information is given by the function : C ! C. Of course, we need a consistency condition on which ensures that all allocations x; G are in fact nal, i.e., that agents cannot improve upon them any further.
It should be noted that is related to the standards of behavior" dened in Greenberg 15 . A standard of behavior describes what happens if agents start at a particular position" in a game. A position in our model corresponds to an allocation and the amount of publicly revealed information.
De nition 3. is consistent if and only if the following conditions hold. C1 x;G = x; G is incentive compatible given x; G;G G ; andx i , x i isG-measurable for every i 2 I and for all x; G 2 C. C2 x; G improves upon x; G, for all x; G 2 C. C3 x; G = x; G for all x; G 2 C. C4 Let x;G = x; G, where x; G 2 C is arbitrary. Then the following does not hold:
There exists y;H 2 C with H G such that ỹ;H = y;H is incentive compatible given x;G and strictly improves upon x;G. C1 indicates that informationG can be revealed in an incentive compatible way. Condition C2 speci es that agents will not trade unless they expect to improve as a consequence. C3 is the requirement that no further trade occurs once a nal allocation and the nal amount of information is obtained. C4 speci es that agents do not expect to be able to improve upon a nal allocation either by reallocating goods or by revealing more information.
Remark. In C4 we only excluded the possibility that the grand coalition can improve upon a nal outcome x;G = x; G. Would it be nevertheless possible for some coalition S I to improve themselves through further trading and information revelation?
The answer is no. In particular, assume by w ay o f c o n tradiction that there exists a coalition S which can strictly improve u p o n x;G. Note that this improvements are posterior, i.e., coalition S can obtain allocations y i , i 2 S with P i2S y i = P i2Sxi rather than those for which Note that when trading starts each agent i has only her private information F i and public information is trivial. This is the reason why H = ff gg is chosen in De nition 3 to describe those unimprovable allocations agents can obtain given their initial endowment of information. 4 Existence of Unimprovable Allocations Theorem 1. Let E be a di erential information economy. Assume that is nite, that each agent's utility function u i !; is continuous for all xed ! 2 , and that X i is a closed s u b s e t o f IR l + . 17 Then unimprovable allocations exist.
Corollary 1 below is useful for nding unimprovable allocations. Corollary 1 indicates that one can always restrict attention to x; G 2 C that cannot be strictly improved upon by some other allocation y;G 2 C. T h us, letĈ = fx;G 2 C j there does not exist y;G 2 C which strictly improves upon x; Gg. Moreover, it is su cient t o n d on a subset ofĈ. In particular, letĈ x;G = fx;G 2Ĉ j Eu i !;x i j F i _ G Eu i !;x i j F i _ G , where at least one inequality is strict, andG G g .
For example, if = f! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 g, G = ff! 1 g; f! 2 ; ! 3 gg, a n d i f x; G 2Ĉ, The proof of Theorem 1 follows from a backward induction argument over the amount of public information G. One starts with complete information. Allocations must then be complete information Pareto e cient. One then constructs inductively a consistent for coarser information sets. The backward induction argument also implies that in an application, does not need to be constructed on all of C, as Corollaries 1 indicates. Moreover, Corollary 1 implies that unimprovable allocations cannot be dominated by any other allocation which can be obtained by using the publicly available information. 17 Note that under the assumptions of Yannelis 30 , X i can also be a subset of an in nite dimensional space. 18 This is the case since no allocation x 0 ; G can dominate x; G i f x; G 2Ĉ. Thus, G = ff! 1 ; ! 2 gg in all unimprovable allocations since unimprovable allocations exist by Theorem 1. Then because net trades are G-measurable, they must be state independent. Thus, the buyer's expected utility i s 4 :5x + m. H o wever, this means that the buyer is willing to pay at most 4.5 units of money for the car. Consequently, the seller will not be willing to trade if ! = ! 1 . T h us, no trade will occur, i.e., neither lemons nor good quality c a r s will be sold.
What explains the di erence between this result and that of the competitive model used by A k erlof? In the competitive model a price is realized at which o n l y o wners of lemons sell their car. However, this means that after trade has occurred, sellers who did not trade are known to have a high quality car. Such an outcome can be improved upon, that is, trade of high quality cars should now t a k e place. Thus, sellers of lemons have the incentive not to o er their car, expecting that a buyer will believe the car to be of good quality. Our solution concepts takes this e ect into account and it is the reason why m a r k ets break down completely.
We n o w s h o w that it is possible for some trade to occur, if there are more than two t ypes of cars. In particular, assume that there are three states = f! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 g which occur with the same probability. Moreover, if ! 2 f ! 2 ; ! 3 g then according to the buyer's updated prior each state occurs with probability 0 . 5 . T h us, as we h a ve s h o wn above, only no trade is unimprovable. Using Corollary 1, we can therefore conclude that we found an unimprovable allocation in which only cars of the lowest quality are traded.
Our concept applied to the lemons problem therefore has two predictions. First, as in Akerlof 1 only low quality cars are traded. However, unlike Akerlof's result we need more than two qualities" in order to prevent full information revelation ex-post.
Insurance with Adverse Selection
We n o w apply our general model and the solution concept to insurance markets with adverse selection. That is, we will consider a risk neutral agent who can insure some risk averse agents against an accident a l o w endowment realization. In this application, the agents' consumption set will be the set of all insurance contracts. used as a renegotiation proofness constraint. In particular, as in Asheim and Nilssen 4 once a contract is agreed upon and before it is known whether an accident has occurred, agents can renegotiate. Moreover, agents have correct expectations on how new contracts will be further renegotiated upon. First, we s h o w that if there are two r i s k t ypes, only pooling contracts are unimprovable. Pooling also includes the case where none of the agents is insured. At then end of this section, we argue that if there are more than two types, some separation is possible. Speci cally, t h e a g e n ts with the highest risk will be insured, and the lower risk agents will remain uninsured. The result has some similarity with those in Asheim and Nilssen 4 . However, in their model some of the high risk agents together with all low risk agents remain uninsured.
Consider a standard model of an economy w i t h a d v erse selection. That is, there is a risk averse agent agent 1 w h o w ants to receive insurance from a risk neutral agent agent 2 against a low endowment realization. However, agent 1 has private information about the probability of a loss a low realization.
Speci cally, assume that in the high endowment state the agent receives a units of income, whereas she receives 0 units in the low state. The agent's utility from x units of income is vx, where v is continuous, monotone, and strictly concave. If the consumer is of the good" type, then the probability of the high realization is q g . In contrast, if the agent is of the bad type then this probability i s q b , where q b q g . The risk neutral agent does not know whether the insured agent is of the good or the bad type. Assume that agent 1 is of the good or the bad type with probabilities p g and p b , respectively.
Below w e s h o w h o w this economy can be written in the language of our general model. We then show that only pooling contracts, i.e., insurance contracts which a r e n o t t ype dependent, are unimprovable. The intuition behind the result is the following.
In order to induce agents to self select by t h e i r t ypes, a contract must provide partial insurance to low r i s k a g e n ts. However, this outcome can be improved upon. In particular, because agents self select, full revelation of information is obtained. Unimprovable allocations would then be complete information Pareto e cient and consequently entail complete insurance. However, any c o n tract which i n volves complete insurance cannot be used to separate types. This rules out separating contracts. Therefore, unimprovable allocations must involve pooling.
The only relevant information in the model is the type g or b of the agent. Thus, choose = fg;bg where g and b occur with probabilities p g and p b , respectively. Note that we w i l l h a ve either full information revelation G = ffgg; fbgg, or no information revelation, G = ffg;bgg. Full revelation corresponds to type separation whereas no information revelation corresponds to pooling.
Furthermore, let x h and x l denote the consumption in the high and in the low state, respectively. T h us, X i = IR We w ant to show that pooling contracts are always optimal. In a pooling contract, the net-trade between the two agents is independent of the state ! = g;b. T h us, since the endowments are state independent, agents' consumption in both states is the same, i.e., x i g = x i b, i = 1 ; 2. In contrast, in a separating contracts the net trades are state dependent and consequently, x; x. Thus, we h a ve a pooling contract, a contradiction. Now consider an insurance problem with three risk types, ! i , i = 1 ; 2; 3, where i = 1 is the lowest and i = 3 the highest risk type. Thus, q ! 1 q ! 2 q ! 3 . Assume that ! i occurs with probability p i . M o r e o ver, assume that the probabilities and the utility functions are chosen such t h a t i f i t i s k n o w that ! 2 f ! 1 ; ! 2 g then the only pooling contract is not to be insured. Thus, G = ff! 1 ; ! 2 g;f! 3 gg together with full insurance if ! = ! 1 and no insurance for ! 2 f ! 2 ; ! 3 g is unimprovable. The argument is similar to that for the lemons market with three states. In other words, the highest risk types are completely insured, whereas both lower risk types are uninsured. 6 Relationship to E ciency Concepts 6.1 Ex-Ante and Interim Incentive E ciency
We n o w discuss the relationship of unimprovability to e ciency concepts which can be found in the literature. First, consider the de nition of interim incentive e ciency of Holmstr om and Myerson 17 . ! 2 , where the strict inequality holds for at least one agent on a set of positive probability. Now n o t e t h a t i f w e replace in 3 interim by ex-ante expected utility t h e n w e get the de nition of ex-ante incentive e ciency. However, as pointed out in Holmstr om and Myerson 17, Section 6 interim incentive e ciency is not a positive solution concept. Speci cally, they provide an example in which agents can improve upon a decision rule which i s i n terim incentive e cient. We n o w discuss this example as it shows immediately why i n terim incentive e cient allocations are not necessarily unimprovable. The example also has the property t h a t t h e i n terim incentive e cient allocation is ex-ante incentive e cient. Thus, the analysis in this section also shows that ex-ante incentive e cient allocations need not be unimprovable.
Instead of an exchange economy, Holmstr om and Myerson consider a collective c hoice problem. Two agents i = 1 ; 2 m ust make a joint decision among three possible choices which are denoted by A, B, C. 21 Thus, the model differs from the exchange economy with di erential information considered in this paper. However, one can easily map the decision problem above i n to our general problem. In particular, consider an exchange economy with two agents. Let e i , i = 1 ; 2 denote the agents' endowments. Now assume there are solely three feasible allocations, x A , x B , x C which m a k e both agents better o than under autarky. All other allocations give a g e n ts the same utility u as under autarky, independent of the state !. T h us, in addition to u the following three utilities can be obtained: u !;A , u !;B , u !;C . W e c hoose u such that u u !;j , for all ! 2 a n d j = A; B; C. T h e n i n a n y e x -a n te and interim incentive e cient, and in unimprovable allocations only x A , x B , a n d x C will occur. Thus, these allocations correspond exactly to the three joint actions in the decision problem. As a consequence, our de nition of unimprovability can be applied to such problems. In this example Holmstr om and Myerson point out that choosing A in state 1a; 2a, choosing B in states 1a; 2b, 1b; 2b, and choosing C in 1b; 2a is ex-ante and interim incentive e cient. Now assume that agent 1 i s o f type 1a. Since agent 2 is always best o with choice A, one would imagine that agent 1 w ould propose choosing A instead of B, t h us deviating from the interim incentive e cient decision rule. The interim incentive e cient decision rule speci ed above is therefore not one which w e w ould expect agents to use. Is the above decision rule unimprovable? The argument in the previous paragraph immediately s h o ws that the answer is no. In particular, the above decision rule requires that each a g e n t reports all her information. Thus, G corresponds to full information. Now consider the alternative decision rule where A instead of B is chosen in state 1a; 2b. This decision rule is again measurable with respect to G. Moreover, it dominates the original one and it is incentive compatible with respect to G, because G already corresponds to complete information. 23 Thus, conditions C2 and C4 of De nition 3 imply that the decision rule can be improved upon.
What is the structure of all unimprovable decision rules? In order to determine them one can proceed by b a c kward induction on G. T h us, we rst assume that G corresponds to full information. The only incentive compatible decision rules which cannot be dominated by another G-measurable decision rule involves choosing A in states 1a; 2a a n d 1 a; 2b. In the remaining states the same action must be chosen. Secondly, assume that G 0 G is the information revealed in an unimprovable decision rule. Then the decision rule must also involve c hoosing A in states 1a; 2a a n d 1 a; 2b. Otherwise, agents could reveal all information and modify their decision rule to one where A is chosen in both of the two states. Thus, all unimprovable decision rules involve c hoosing A in states 1a; 2a, 1a; 2b, and choosing, because of incentive compatibility, the same action j = A; B; C in the remaining states. Thus, if j = A the information G revealed can be arbitrary. If j 6 = A, then we c a n h a ve G = ff1a;2a, 1a; 2bg, f1b; 2a, 1b; 2bg, o r G corresponding to complete information.
Durability
The concept of Durability w as introduced in Holmstr om and Myerson 17 to describe decision rules from which agents would not deviate at the interim. They de ne a decision rule as durable if and only if the following holds: Let 0 be an arbitrary decision rule. Then it must be the case that in a voting game where agents decide whether or not to switch from to any alternative decision rule 0 , s t a ying with is a perfect equilibrium in the sense of Selten 27 . This formulation is modi ed in Crawford 9 , where agents rst choose a mechanism at the interim and then follow t h e c hosen mechanism.
There are a number of di erences between our concept and durability. Speci cally, durable decision rules allow agents to fully reveal all information.
Moreover, once a decision rule is agreed upon, agents must adhere to it, i.e., further retrading is not allowed. Recall that in our model agents are free to trade as long as they desire to do so. Also, because of coordination problems in the voting game, agents will not always adopt decision rules 0 which dominate . Consider the following example discussed in Holmstr om and Myerson 17, Section 9 .
As in the previous example, there are two a g e n ts i = 1 ; 2. Each agent i can be of one of two t ypes t i = ia; ib. T h us, we h a ve again four states in . In contrast to the previous decision problem there are now only two c hoices, A and B. A g e n ts' utilities now also depend on the type of the other agent and are given by In other words, if agents' types match then they receive the highest payo from choosing B. If the types do not match, then agents are better o choosing A. In fact, we h a ve just described the only interim incentive e cient decision rule. However, Holmstr om and Myerson point out that choosing A independent o f t ypes is durable.
What decision rules in this example are unimprovable? If G corresponds to full information then agents must choose B if their types match a n d A otherwise. Any other decision rule is dominated. Now assume that only information G 0 less than full information is revealed. Then revealing all information and choosing A or B depending on whether or not types match dominates any other decision rule and it is incentive compatible. Thus, there exists exactly one unimprovable decision rule and it coincides with the interim incentive e cient one. The durable decision rule where agents choose A independent o f t h e i r t ypes can be improved upon.
Concluding Remarks and Extensions
We started this paper with the following question: What allocations describe absence of improving trades for exchange economies with incomplete information?
We h a ve s h o wn that one can nd a consistent solution concept unimprovability which exists under weak conditions, has interesting properties, and is relatively easy to compute in standard examples of economies with incomplete information. In order to get a consistent solution concept it turns out to be essential that agents are forward looking when deciding about what information to reveal. This is a feature which should be important in de ning any cooperative solution concepts e.g., the core for economies with adverse selection.
For economies with two a g e n ts, the concept in this paper already has characteristics of the core and can as a consequence be compared to existing concepts of a core with di erential information e.g., Yannelis 30 , Allen 4 and Vohra 28 .
In the private core of Yannelis 30 net trades are required to be measurable with respect to each a g e n t's private information F i . In the case of two agents, feasibility implies that net trades are therefore measurable with respect to common knowledge information F 1F 2 . In contrast, in our solution concept measurability of net trades with respect to some information set G is not assumed but rather a consequence of the solution concept proved in Theorem 1. Moreover, G is endogenously determined in our solution concept.
In Vohra 28 and Allen 3 , a coalition S can obtain all feasible, individually Bayesian incentive compatible allocations. Blocking can be de ned with respect to agents' ex-ante or interim expected utility. Information revealed through trades, however, cannot be used for blocking by coalitions of agents. Thus, this concept can be useful to describe trade ex-ante, when agents can sign binding agreements before they become informed, but it can be problematic in environments where agents trade or can change past agreements at a time when they are already di erentially informed. It should be noted that adverse selection problems arise precisely in the latter case.
Finally, w e illustrate the di erences to our solution concept by means of two examples.
First, consider the economy with adverse selection and two states in Section 5.2. Here G = F 1F 2 , and hence our solution coincides with the private core. In contrast, in the core of Allen 3 and Vohra 28 agents would be able to obtain state contingent trades i.e., separating contracts. The reason for this result is that by assumption the information revealed by t ype separation cannot be used for further blocking. Now consider as another example an economy w i t h t wo a g e n ts, two goods, and two states. Agent 1's utility function is u 1 !;x 1 ; x 2 = x 1 x 2 . Agent 1's endowment in the two states is 4; 0 and 0; 4. On the other hand, the two goods are perfect substitutes for agent 2 , i . e . , u 2 !;x 1 ; x 2 = x 1 + x 2 . T h e agent has no information, and an endowment o f 2 ; 2 in both states. It is easy to see that in all unimprovable allocations G corresponds to complete information, and agents will obtain complete information Pareto e cient allocations. This seems to be a reasonable prediction as agent 1 has no advantage from misreporting his endowment. Moreover, the state can also be credibly signaled if agent 1 s h o ws the endowment to agent 2 . V ohra and Allen's core provides the same result as our concept. In contrast, in the private core, net trades would have to be measurable with respect to F 1F 2 and hence autarky will be the result.
there exists y;
